

Sydney Olympic Park

Master Plan

2030

(Interim Metro Review)





Sydney Olympic Park Authority

Master Plan 2030 Update - Safety & Security Strategy Central Precinct

SUMMARY REPORT

4 August 2021

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1 Introduction

The Sydney Olympic Park Master Plan 2030 (2018 review) sets out the vision for the revitalisation of Sydney Olympic Park with a vibrant new town centre, educational facilities, shopping precinct, new homes, more jobs and increased open space and community facilities while enhancing the Park's role as the premier destination for cultural, entertainment, recreation and sporting events.

Following the commitment by the NSW Government to the delivery of Sydney Metro West within Sydney Olympic Park, Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA) is pursuing an amendment to the Master Plan to facilitate and accommodate the metro station within Central Precinct. A key component of the amendment includes refinement and changes to the street network and changes to built form controls to enable the Metro Station and integrated station development.

Central Precinct is bounded by Murray Rose Avenue to the north, Australia Avenue to the east, Sarah Durack Avenue to the south and Olympic Boulevard to the west. Dawn Fraser Avenue and Herb Elliot Avenue in the north of the Central Precinct have established urban characters comprising office buildings with continuous shopfronts along both streets, centred on the existing heavy rail Train Station. Whilst the remainder of the Central Precinct, currently comprises low rise, large floorplate commercial and industrial buildings, hotels and residential flat buildings.

In summary, the amendments to the Master Plan include:

- Integration of Sydney Metro West station box into the Central Precinct;
- Integration of a pedestrian plaza from Olympic Boulevard to the Metro Station;
- Location of the bus interchange on Fig Tree Drive;
- Refinement of the street hierarchy to integrate with the Metro Station;
- Integration and connection of Central Urban Park to the Abattoir Precinct;
- Integration of fine grain streets and through site links into the urban network;
- Amendments to the land use controls to integrate the Metro Station into the Central Precinct;
- Amendments to the building height controls and other planning controls as necessary.

The Metro Site comprises several parcels of land, totalling 3.3ha whilst the Central Precinct comprises 26.3ha of land.

1.1 Scope and Purpose of this Report

This Safety & Security Strategy Report ('the report') seeks to support the preparation of a Public Domain Framework that outlines how potential future crime and safety risks in relation to the development will be addressed.

This Summary Report is an abridged version of the complete report issued to SOPA on 21 July 2021. The complete report includes a detailed analysis of security risks to the Central Precinct and other sensitive information not releasable for public exhibition.

This report is inclusive of the two following elements:

1. *Assessment and Recommendations for Safety & Security of the Central Precinct*
2. *Safety and Security Strategy*

1.2 Key References

This report has considered and sought to apply the objectives and guidance contained in the following documents developed by the Government Architect of NSW:

- Better Placed – An integrated design policy for the built environment of New South Wales (2017)
- Greener Places Design Guide (2020)
- Practitioner’s Guide to Movement and Place – Implementing Movement and Place in NSW (2020)
- Connecting with Country – A draft framework for understanding the value of Aboriginal knowledge in the design and planning of places (2020).

The principal role of safety and security is to support the creation of safe, inviting and accessible spaces that contribute to quality and liveability.

1.3 Site Overview

1.3.1 Site Overview – Current

Sydney Olympic Park (SOP) comprises 640 hectares, of which 500 are public spaces or parklands. The site is located approximately 16 kilometres west of the Sydney CBD and 7 kilometres east of the Parramatta CBD. The site was developed for the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

The SOPA Master Plan 2030 aims to develop the Sydney Olympic Park Town Centre as an active and vibrant destination within Metropolitan Sydney. The SOP Town Centre is located in the south of the Olympic Park with Olympic Boulevard, Dawn Fraser Avenue and Murray Rose Avenue as major road axes. It is divided into nine precincts, of which the Central Precinct is the residential and commercial hub.

The core of the Central Precinct is the existing Olympic Park train station. South of the station is set out as a business park along tree-lined streets. A small heritage site comprising five small-scale buildings, The Abattoir, is located between Dawn Fraser Avenue and Herb Elliot Avenue. The rest of the business park is characterised with commercial, mixed use and residential high-rise developments. Significant number of parklands add to the character and quality of the area.

1.3.2 Site Overview - Emerging

The Central Precinct will continue to transform into a vibrant, high density mixed use Town Centre with a strong commercial office and retail area to the north and a residential character along Figtree Drive.

The northern part of the Central Precinct on Herb Elliott Avenue will provide a wide range of complementary civic, retail, commercial, educational, community and entertainment uses. This diverse mix of uses will ensure high levels of amenity for residents, workers and visitors during the day and into the evening.

The southern part of the Central Precinct on Figtree Drive will be a high-density residential area focused along a green corridor created by the wide landscaped setbacks along Figtree Drive, and the linear park along the railway line.



Figure 1: Illustrative Structure Plan for Central Precinct

According to the Metro West Design Report (EDS), the Emerging Master Plan provides for the incorporation of Metro, surrounding streets and public spaces within the central Precinct.




Figure 2: Central Precinct and location of Sydney Metro station area

The proposed Metro station will sit to the east of Olympic Boulevard with the main station entrances between Herb Elliot Avenue and Figtree Drive and off Dawn Fraser Avenue. It will be south of the existing Olympic Park station. The proposed location provides connectivity to both the Stadia Precinct for large scale events, adjacent catchments including Haslam's Creek and Carter Street, and is immediately adjacent to the proposed Town Centre.

The new station will reinforce SOP's status as Australia's premier events, sporting and entertainment precinct supporting the transit of Greater Sydney, its residents and visitors.

The station is required to accommodate patronage for both event and business-as-usual (BAU) modes, providing large scale spaces for crowd marshalling during major events of over 25,000 people as well as creating a scaled experience for day-to-day users.

During current BAU or day-to-day use, Dawn Fraser Avenue and Herb Elliot Avenue are the existing main pedestrian streets of the locality. SOPA's planned renewal of the Central Precinct will create new pedestrian priority streets along with a new street parallel and south of Herb Elliot Avenue which will become the primary east-west pedestrian spine of the Central Precinct in the future. Olympic Boulevard is the major north-south pedestrian spine primarily used during events.

Further development at the Central Precinct will follow guidelines outlined in the Master Plan 2030 (2018 Review):

- Increase in residential dwellings to accommodate 23 000+ persons.
- Significant increase in office and retail space and up to 30 000+ workers.
- Higher frequency of night-time activities in the public domain.

1.3.3 Site Safety & Security Considerations

Several features make the Central Precinct a unique site from a security management perspective:

- High variability in patronage for BAU and major event day activities demands flexibility in the safety and security overlay.
- Distinct zones of activity with varying risk profiles.
- Multiple places of mass gathering for major events including public domain, train station, Metro station and bus hub.
- Wide expanse and inherently open nature of the Central Precinct makes it difficult to control and restrict access (when required) and monitor all spaces.

Design planning for new developments will need to consider:

- Delineation of boundaries between SOPA and land-owners / developers.
- The nature of facilities located on ground levels of new developments and their interface with the Central Precinct public domain.
- Providing an appropriate security posture to accommodate variations in use during varying operating modes.

2 CPTED Assessment & Recommendations

2.1 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

Peoples' behaviour, particularly in terms of the possibility of offending, as well as an individual's perception about their safety, can be influenced by the design of that environment. The concept of CPTED is to therefore to design physical features for public spaces, buildings, and their surroundings to produce desired behavioural effects in the users of the space while facilitating the observation of and response to criminal behaviours.

CPTED guidelines support SOPA's intention to create a vibrant, safe and secure Central Precinct by:

- Removing conditions that create confusion about required norms of behaviour.
- Reducing potential rewards of crime by minimising, removing or concealing crime benefits.
- Increasing the effort required to commit crime by increasing the energy, time or resources that need to be expended.
- Increasing the perception of risk to criminals by increasing the possibility of detection, capture and challenge.

2.2 Applicability to Site

The highest numbers of offences in SOP and the Parramatta LGA include crimes typically regarded as opportunistic (assault, stealing, property damage and drug offences), CPTED has a definite role to play in creating an environment that does not facilitate these crime types – well lit, defined, maintained, active spaces that are easily observed and invite behaviour that promotes a sense of safety in legitimate users, whilst deterring would-be offenders.

It should be noted that CPTED strategies alone will not make areas completely safe for the community and their property. CPTED principles must work in conjunction with other crime prevention strategies, precinct security (including SOPA Rangers) and wider police operations (as appropriate). This report does not consider construction stage security risks for new developments.

2.3 Methodology

The CPTED report assesses the current concept design, identifying strengths and weaknesses from a designing out crime perspective, and provides guidance on ways to incorporate or enhance CPTED within the design. The assessment followed a methodology consistent with ISO 22341:2021 – Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and other good guidance.

The following tasks were undertaken in the preparation of this assessment:

- A Crime Risk Assessment including: (i) analysis of crime statistics for the suburb of Olympic Park, the local government area (LGA) and NSW-wide; (ii) review of available SOPA incident reporting.
- Desktop review of Master Plan update plans, including preliminary plans of the Sydney Metro site for evidence of incorporation of the CPTED principles of:
 - Surveillance (natural and technical)
 - Access control
 - Territorial reinforcement
 - Target hardening

2.4 Crime Risk Assessment

The overall crime risk for the Central Precinct is considered 'low' for the foreseeable future (refer note below). This assessment is based on:

- Low levels of crime and anti-social behaviour associated with day-to-day use of the Central Precinct
- The mixed used nature of the Town Centre will promote varying day and night-time uses of the site and is unlikely to become a hotspot for adverse and anti-social behaviours
- The Precinct will not have a high density of large, licensed premises (bars and clubs) with late-night operating hours
- The absence of indicators of anti-social behaviour such as graffiti, damage and dumping.
- High levels of public access and complimentary uses of facilities
- SOPA's diligent approach to cleaning, maintenance and security of the public domain to ensure the quality and liveability.
- Existing natural surveillance provided by surrounding uses and availability of open spaces.

Note: A reasonable horizon for the assessment is 3-5 years. Beyond that timeline, it is difficult to predict changes in the threat environment, including the tactics and methods of potential perpetrators. The assessment is likely to remain valid for an enduring period including the early stages of building out the Master Plan development, however it will require future review and validation to re-confirm the analysis and ratings.

2.5 Design Assessment

Limited detail exists in relation to external landscaping, services provisioning or the physical interface between development sites and the public domain. It is recommended that further CPTED reviews are undertaken as the design of these areas develops.

2.5.1 Public Domain

The Central Precinct public domain consists of publicly accessible plaza areas, roadways and interfaces with developments and retail facilities.

The site design emphasises circulation and an uncluttered environment which assists in creating open spaces with high levels of natural surveillance. Component sites within the Central Precinct have linear frontages to the public domain without many corners or obstructions that limit surveillance across wide areas. This is supported by ground level tenancies, retail and activated spaces that currently, and in the future, provide surveillance and territorial reinforcement through promoting activity and legitimate uses of the Central Precinct.

Pedestrian thoroughfares are straight with minimal visual impediments that allow clear wayfinding along these routes. This review has not identified any areas of the public domain where concealment and isolation are likely to occur. Pedestrian activity is centred on Dawn Fraser Avenue and Australia Avenue, areas south of Dawn Fraser are predominantly commercial sites that are active primarily on week days.

Plans indicate an intent to provide landscaped features throughout the Central Precinct which will further enhance surveillance, as well as territorial reinforcement, by providing physical structures that give patrons the opportunity to congregate and observe their surroundings. There is potential for the same features to be used to provide target hardening of the public domain, by providing a physical barrier to vehicle access in pedestrianised spaces.

2.5.2 Metro Site

The Metro site seeks to provide a large open space that has the scale and capacity to suit major event needs, while acting as the town centre for the resident and working population on a day-to-day basis.

The key feature of the Metro site from a CPTED perspective is the creation of a number of new public domain spaces and pedestrianised zones. This includes:

- The 'Central Green' adjacent to the Station envelope on the eastern side.
- The landscaped space (Miluni Plaza) connecting the station entries to Olympic Boulevard.
- A new pedestrian only east-west link located south of Herb Elliott Avenue between Olympic Boulevard and the Metro station.
- Enhanced pedestrian connectivity east-west and north-south via The Promenade, with activated retail and mixed use building frontages




Figure 3: Proposed new public domain spaces (Source: Sydney Metro West Design Report SMWSTEDS-SMD-OLP-AT-RPT-044002)

PUBLIC DOMAIN - CENTRAL PRECINCT METRO CORE



Figure 4: Central Precinct Metro Core and proposed space usage (Source: Sydney Olympic Park Central Precinct – Place Design and Public Domain Framework [Core Precinct])

The proposed design provides good opportunities to apply CPTED principles of natural surveillance, natural access control and territorial reinforcement through activation. Sightlines will be maximised within the Metro site with large open spaces and linear building lines. Linkages to the Heritage precinct and Olympic Boulevard will also enable visibility into and out of areas around the Metro station. Tower developments adjacent to the Metro site will also overlook the public domain to add to the sense of natural surveillance.

The predominance of retail frontages also provides surveillance but also strongly enhances the activation of space and presence of people that comes with greater pedestrianisation.



Figure 5: Central Precinct active frontage plan (Source: SOPA)

Narrow spaces between buildings (such as the station entry and station service buildings and Metro over-station developments) which are not natural pedestrian thoroughfares will require technical surveillance, lighting and other deterrent and detection measures to discourage unobserved activity.

Movement through the Metro Site will connect the bus interchanges to the south with the Metro Station and train station to the north, creating natural and consistent paths of movement across the day.

The Metro will become a predominant form of major event transport (with similar patronage to the station), with Miluni Plaza forming the marshalling zone for the Metro in event mode. Providing protection of pedestrians concentrated in this area from vehicle movements on Olympic Boulevard will need to be considered alongside road closures and traffic management arrangements.

Similarly, pedestrianised spaces that interface with the road network at Herb Elliott Avenue and Fig Tree Drive will need to consider protections for pedestrian safety. The site proposes to enclose and protect these spaces using an extensive tree canopy planted in deep soil, although the feasibility of using trees will need to be determined based on further investigation. Using mature planting as barriers to vehicle access is a preferred methodology to security bollards (provided trees offer the requisite degree of impact resistance and deterrence).

Creation of the fine grain road network around the Metro site will offer permeability but will need to ensure it does not create actual or perceived crime opportunities – relative to the major public domain spaces – because they are less protected or have lower levels of surveillance and activity.

2.6 CPTED Recommendations

The intent arising from the CPTED assessment process is to identify good practice already in the design and provide recommendations for mutually supportive measures that can be incorporated into the design of the development and its immediate surrounds – directly enhancing security of the Central Precinct and Metro areas as well as contributing to risk mitigation for the wider precinct.

The Central Precinct plan is at an early stage and is already demonstrating positive incorporation of CPTED guidelines. As the design continues to develop, and further detail is incorporated, the following recommendations will embed CPTED deeper in the design:

- Surveillance
 - The landscaping of streets and open spaces should enable natural surveillance and clear lines of sight by minimising obstructive plantings between 0.5m above ground level to circa 2.0M.
 - The soft landscaping should use low-density plants or planting at spacing to ensure that as landscaping matures it does not give rise to concealment opportunities and does not restrict sightlines. Specified landscape maintenance procedures should be established.
 - Pedestrian entrances and exits to Metro and buildings should be placed in locations where they are clearly visible from landscaped areas where possible and opportunities for lingering should be incorporated into landscaping to promote surveillance.
 - Pedestrian routes and the landscape should be lit after dark (to comply with Australian Standard AS/NZS 1158 for pedestrian areas). The use of adequate lighting will reduce the incidence of night-time loitering and the opportunity for concealment of offenders.
 - Seating should be in highly visible and well-lit areas. Lighting should enable surveillance both of and from these seating areas. However, as previously stated, lighting these areas well should not inadvertently create glare or contrast issues in neighbouring areas.
 - CCTV and lighting plans for the public domain shall be coordinated to ensure they are mutually supportive. These plans shall also be incorporated into the overall landscape plan.
 - Barriers around the upper levels of publicly accessible and semi-publicly accessible spaced should be visually permeable. This will create clear sight lines from and to the public domain or lower levels within buildings.
 - Consider the use and placement of concierges, building supervisors and other staff to increase offender risk and crime effort within the building footprint and around entrances.
- Natural Access Control
 - Pedestrian zones in areas close to vehicle movement should be clearly defined to increase the sense of pedestrian safety.
 - Changes in surface finishes can be utilised to define changes in land use or changes in ownership, or to denote changes between pedestrian zones and shared use zones
- Territorial reinforcement
 - Wayfinding and signage should clearly indicate pedestrian routes and destinations and remain current with the development of the Central Precinct. This instils confidence in legitimate users and deters loitering.
 - Users must be able to understand which routes they use and be able to quickly orient themselves with locate amenities. Good signage and wayfinding strategies reduce

vulnerabilities by assisting people to use the safest routes and reduce ambiguity around legitimate access and use.

- Activate spaces that surround the Metro and link the development to adjacent land uses. People are attracted to vibrant public areas. This will enhance the perception of territorial reinforcement and space management.
- The incorporation of public artwork into the public domain (or public access areas) can support a sense of community ownership and policing of the built environment and deter offenders.
- Horizontal flat surfaces should be avoided to the extent possible in publicly accessible areas to reduce opportunities to leave items including rubbish, bags or malicious devices. Sloping surfaces visible to users, including on vending machines and bollards are preferred.
- Target hardening
 - Lighting, CCTV and other urban design elements should use vandal-resistant materials and hardware and enable ease of maintenance and repair to maintain quality and appearance.
 - Video surveillance for building exteriors can be strategically placed to remove blind spots or enhance surveillance in less activated areas or at access points to building or within pedestrian laneways.
 - Landscape design of buildings need to consider if hostile vehicle mitigation is required to protect pedestrian activity in open spaces. Wherever possible, landscaping elements are preferred as they have the ability to contribute to the design aesthetic while also performing a safety and security function.
 - CPTED measures for the public domain should be supported by effective electronic access control, intruder detection and other physical security measures of interfacing buildings.

As with development of the wider security infrastructure design, collaborative design and operational planning between SOPA, developers and key stakeholders is required for CPTED, on the basis that:

- The Central Precinct promotes movement between the public domain and development sites such that consistency of approach and application of an agreed baseline of safety and security measures is required.
- Displacement of security risk events may occur, should potential offenders identify variances in security arrangements between sites.
- Given the proximity and inter-operability of the Central Precinct, a weakness in security design or ongoing security management at one site could result in significant, indirect impacts from risk events affecting other areas of the Central Precinct.

In particular, the design implications will need to consider how event crowds using the Metro station will be managed through the development public domain.

2.7 Example CPTED strategies by project stage

The following table summarises recommended CPTED strategies during all stages of planning, design and operations for developments in the Central Precinct.

Stage	Strategies
Planning	Avoiding blind/entrapment spots
	Socio-demographic character - consider social structure of areas
	Vitality of public spaces; adequate density and activity; proper land use; human scale

	Well-connected, integrated plan; connected streets; proper mixed uses; good street pattern
	Green spaces (urban greenery); controlled green spaces and parks
	Proper placement of lighting and security cameras
	Anti-terrorism planning for target: a temporary or permanent site or building that is sensitive to terrorism (e.g. public plaza, multi-use building or site, school, government building, headquarters of a high-profile company)
Design	Visibility – Landscape; planting; lighting illumination/colour rendering/uniformity; large glass windows
	Access control – Entry barriers, walls and fences, gates certified by relevant performance standards
	Site/target hardening – Soft target building/street hardening through security equipment (e.g. vehicle security barriers, windows and doors, locks, mesh and grilles) certified by relevant security performance standards
	Territoriality – Clear demarcation of space; sense of ownership/responsibility; buffer zone
	Robust materials – Vandal-resistant street furniture; convenient maintenance, integrity of devices used for networks (e.g. data, sensors, energy, water, gas, high pressure steam, air intakes)
	Attractive design, Positive area image; attractive lighting and public art
Site and social management	Maintenance – Clean streets and alleys; emptied garbage bins; greenery and vegetation on public land
	Surveillance – Security cameras for vulnerable spots; police/security guards targeted patrols
	Public rules enforcement – No drinking zone signs; substantial enforcement
	Swift repairs – rapid remediation policy
	Treating vulnerable groups – Providing shelters for homeless people, alcohol/drug addicts, youths
	Publicity activities – Active communications with the public; preventive messages
	Positive area image – attractive lighting and public art

Table 1: Recommended CPTED strategies by project stage

3 Strategic Security Risk Assessment

3.1 Executive Summary

A Strategic Security Risk Assessment (SSRA) was completed to assess the principal security hazards that might impact on the security of people, assets and operations during both Event and Non-Event modes – i.e. business as usual (BAU) – within the Central Precinct and provides the risk basis for development controls to mitigate safety and security issues. The outputs of the SSRA assessment inform design and operational considerations for the Central Precinct to ensure consistent and effective management of risks by SOPA, development proponents and other safety and security stakeholders.

The SSRA considered plausible methods and sources of attack for each of the identified threat events, including analysis of the intent and capability of threat sources and the vulnerability of the Central Precinct to threat events to form ratings of likelihood, consequence and inherent and residual risk.

The SSRA was completed consistent with the approach contained in the International Standard, *Risk Management – Guidelines* (ISO 31000:2018), and guidance documentation from the Australian Government.

3.1.1 Risk Summary

Table 2 below provides a high-level summary of the assessed risk levels for the security hazards relevant to the Central Precinct. Detailed analysis underpinning the ratings is contained in the SSRA (not for public release).

SECURITY HAZARD	INHERENT RISK RATINGS (CURRENT)					
	Event Mode			BAU Mode		
	Likelihood	Consequence	Risk Rating	Likelihood	Consequence	Risk Rating
Person-borne/Placed IED	Unlikely	Catastrophic	MEDIUM	Rare	Catastrophic	LOW
Vehicle-borne IED	Rare	Catastrophic	LOW	Rare	Catastrophic	LOW
Hostile Vehicle Attack	Unlikely	Catastrophic	MEDIUM	Unlikely	Catastrophic	MEDIUM
Small Arms Attack	Possible	Catastrophic	HIGH	Unlikely	Catastrophic	MEDIUM
Aerial-Borne Attack	Rare	Moderate	VERY LOW	Rare	Moderate	VERY LOW
CBR Attack	Rare	Major	VERY LOW	Rare	Major	VERY LOW
Violence / Assault	Likely	Moderate	MEDIUM	Possible	Moderate	MEDIUM
Malicious Damage	Possible	Minor	LOW	Likely	Minor	LOW
Anti-Social Behaviour	Likely	Minor	LOW	Possible	Minor	LOW
Theft / Robbery	Possible	Minor	LOW	Possible	Minor	LOW
Threats and Hoaxes	Possible	Moderate	LOW	Unlikely	Minor	VERY LOW
Civil Disorder	Rare	Minor	VERY LOW	Rare	Minor	VERY LOW

Table 2: Summary of security risk ratings for Central Precinct

3.1.2 General Observations

- Ratings for major event operating mode are generally higher than for BAU mode due to several factors:

- Behaviour of Central Precinct users and event patrons is a primary driver of security risks in event mode. Alcohol consumption is closely linked to the occurrence of crimes such as assault and malicious damage.
- The risk of terrorism is elevated compared with BAU mode as the site will become a 'crowded place' and may become a more attractive target location.
- Small arms attack (using bladed weapons or small firearms) is considered the most likely of all terrorism scenarios. The likelihood of terrorism scenarios can be managed down through design and operational controls, however the potential consequences remain at Catastrophic.
- Opportunistic crimes are more frequent but have lower consequence and in most cases the likelihood can be positively impacted by design and operational controls to ensure the risk remains LOW.
- Risks have been assessed for the foreseeable period of 3-5 years. Beyond this it is not possible to project or assess with confidence the security risk outlook, particularly for terrorism.

4 Safety & Security Strategy

4.1 Precinct-Wide Safety & Security Management

4.1.1 SOPA's safety and security responsibilities

SOPA is responsible for safety and security management of the public domain, and coordination between the various stakeholders within the Precinct:

- Managing day-to-day operations for the public domain;
- Supporting strategic safety and security planning for the Central Precinct;
- Planning for and managing event security in conjunction with Precinct tenants; and
- Monitoring the current security environment and anticipating future security requirements.

4.1.2 Interface between SOPA and third parties, including Sydney Metro

The security requirements for each site are unique, based on the scale and nature of activity. Safety and security for the Central Precinct relies on a harmonised approach between the public domain and individual facilities. Consistent and cohesive safety and security design will enable development of mutually supportive controls that address risks for individual facilities while also contributing to risk mitigation for the wider surrounding area.

Liaison between SOPA, the Metro operator, NSW Police and other major stakeholders will aid in developing an overall sense of shared ownership and territorial reinforcement, especially if that includes patrolling of shared space and sharing of information (and potentially CCTV surveillance outputs).

4.1.3 Information sharing guidelines

SOPA is responsible for safety and security within the public domain; tenants are responsible for security within their own property boundaries. However, the two are closely linked and there is a requirement for effective information sharing in relation to:

- Geographic and operational demarcation of areas of responsibility
- Setting baseline requirements for safety and security design and security management
- Communication and coordination arrangements for business-as-usual and incident/emergency conditions
- Sharing of information regarding trends and issues in safety and security
- Reviewing and investigating safety and security matters

4.1.4 Risk assessment as the design basis

SOPA and applicants should use risk assessment as the primary driver for the selection of physical and operational safety and security controls. Using a risk basis enables early identification of requirements to 'design out' potential safety and security issues, apply controls in a targeted manner and reduce the need to install retrospective treatments.

4.2 Public Domain Safety & Security Design Concept

Safety and security design for the Central Precinct public domain needs to support development of welcoming and activated spaces. The approach should reflect a subtle response to potential risks that is not unnecessarily obtrusive. To the extent possible, the design and operation should:

- Be flexible and scalable so as to be responsive to changes in the threat and risk environment, and to the varying nature of activities occurring in the public domain.

- Implement CPTED principles that aid natural surveillance; lighting; natural access control; territorial reinforcement; site maintenance and management.
- Use technical and physical controls in a holistic and coordinated approach to meet risk requirements without over-engineering or over-provisioning.
- Support Ranger and event personnel in monitoring, controlling and responding to issues.

4.3 Public Domain Safety & Security Controls

The detailed report contains a set of baseline safety and security controls that should be considered for public domain spaces and the building interface. This is not for public release.

4.4 Planning Controls

- Design of new sites shall involve detailed consideration of safety and security to address Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) requirements including:
 - Provide active frontages and active uses along all park and public space frontages, including spaces that are privately and publicly owned or managed.
 - Ensure buildings are designed to contribute to the natural surveillance of adjacent streets and public space.
 - Promote casual views from residences to common internal areas such as lobbies, foyers, hallways, recreation areas and car parks.
 - Provide direct and well-lit access between car parks and dwellings, in car parks and lift lobbies, and to all apartment entrances.
 - Coordinate the lighting plan with the landscape plan to promote surveillance opportunities.
 - Ensure ramps have direct access to building entrances from the street and are visible from the street.
 - Ensure that residential building entry points are within clear site of a public street frontage.
 - For residential building sites, provide clearly defined and defensible separation between public and private areas.
 - For residential buildings, locate the most active rooms, living rooms, kitchens and balconies to overlook the public domain and communal outdoor spaces.
 - Provide reasonable measures to limit the ability for items to be thrown or blown down from balconies into the surrounding public domain.
 - For commercial and mixed use buildings, ensure retail or active uses on the ground floor open directly onto the street and have a clear visual connection with the street. Street level windows are to be clear glazed.
 - Development should ensure that Sydney Olympic Park's Closed Circuit Television coverage is not obstructed or compromised in any way.
 - Utility structures such as electrical substations and car park exhaust vents are not permitted in the public domain.
 - Minimise alcoves or other places of concealment on building exteriors
- Completion of a Safety and Security Management Plan as a mandatory element of a State Significant Development (SSD) application. As per Section 4.4.1 below, the plan shall consider and guide the application of risk-based safety and security measures that positively contribute to the protection of occupants and users of the proposed site, the Central Precinct and the wide SOP.

- Applications that are not SSD may still be required to complete a CPTED assessment.
- Requirement for applicants to consider the proposed development's wider context:
 - The site's immediate perimeter (e.g. landscaped areas, pathways, driveways, carparks, substations, outdoor seating, signage etc.).
 - The built environment of the surrounding Central Precinct within which the development is situated and the activities occurring within the Central Precinct.
 - The nature and level of interaction between the building and the wider Park (e.g. road links, proximity to major sites and activity zones)
- Completion of a Security Risk Assessment by a licenced security consultant (Class 2A):
 - Risk assessment to be consistent with ISO 31000 (Risk Management)
 - Consideration of hazards including, but not limited to:
 - terrorism (directed at or occurring at the proposed development),
 - crime hazards (e.g. violence and assault, robbery and theft, malicious damage, trespass)
 - anti-social and disorderly behaviour
 - safety hazards (e.g. hazardous materials, site machinery and equipment, pedestrian safety)

4.4.1 Safety & Security Management Plan Components

Security Plan Component	Action Required
1. Precinct Operational Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A written statement from the applicant explaining how the site's design has included consideration of the Central Precinct's safety and security requirements for both non-event and event modes.
2. Identification of Potential Hazards and Risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A risk assessment that identifies safety and security hazards, assessment of risk levels and description of controls that are proposed to manage risks.
3. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Statement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A description of the practical means by which CPTED principles are incorporated into the design.
4. Proposed Building and Site Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● An outline of proposed safety and security: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Physical security systems ○ Security management approach (e.g. security presence, response) ○ Any modified arrangements to site operations and access during major events

Table 3: Safety & Security Management Plan Components for SSD applications

5 Conclusion & Recommendations

The Safety and Security Assessment has demonstrated that the proposed Central Precinct, notably the Metro station, integrated station development and the revised public domain, has an overall low risk exposure. The amendments to the Master Plan build on the existing, effective approach to safety and security by incorporating design controls and operational management strategies to address risks.

The basis for effective safety and security is consultative dialogue with SOPA and the completion and implementation of a Safety and Security Management Plan as a mandatory element of a State Significant Development (SSD) applications.

The key issues identified in the assessment are:

- The need to deter opportunistic crime common to public domain spaces.
- Terrorism risks are higher when SOP is hosting events, however there is a residual terrorism risk outside of event periods that needs to be considered in the development and ongoing management of the Central Precinct.
- The nature and general level of crime is not expected to change significantly (or adversely), and the amendments will promote multiple uses of the Central Precinct during the day, at night and during events. Activity levels are likely to positively contribute to crime prevention.

The above issues can be managed via a consistent and cohesive approach to safety and security that includes:

- Taking a risk-based approach to design of the Metro, integrated development, public domain and all future site developments. The design shall be flexible to the varying needs and operating modes of the Precinct and to changes in the safety and security risk environment.
- Adopting Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design measures that will contribute to a minimisation of all forms of crime.
- Implementing security systems and infrastructure for sites that is discrete but effective, and integrated with the site surrounds.
- Enabling SOPA rangers (for the public domain) and site personnel to actively monitor, respond and manage issues promptly.